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Ever since the Treaty of Westphalia established the modern legal order, the 
sovereignty of states is one of the foundational principles of public interna-
tional law. The principles of state sovereignty and sovereign equality have 
been reaffirmed in Art. 2(1) of the United Nations Charter and form the bed-
rock of the post–World War II international legal order. This legal order, con-
ceived in a time when global computer networks carrying information across 
continents in seconds and making it available without regard for location and 
geographical distance were but a distant dream, must evolve to account for 
new technological developments such as the rise of information and com-
munication technologies (ICTs), which link states and people closer together 
through cyberspace. Faced with a new medium with unique characteristics 
of ubiquity and aterritoriality of information, states as the principal actors of 
the international legal order had to decide whether this new medium—cyber-
space—is a unique “space,” requiring a different set of rules governing state 
rights and state behavior, or whether existing rules of international still apply.
Gradually, a consensus has begun to form around the proposition that 
rules and principles of international law, as enshrined in the UN Charter, 
apply in cyberspace. As the former legal adviser to the US Department of 
State, Harold Koh, put it: “cyberspace is not a ‘law-free’ zone where anyone 
can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraint. (. . .) States conduct-
ing activities in cyberspace must take into account the sovereignty of other 
states” (Koh 2012, 3, 6). This consensus has been cemented through the work 
of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in 
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Interna-
tional Security (GGE), which in 2013 and 2015 issued two reports detailing 
the rules and principles of international law applicable to state behavior 
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in cyberspace (United Nations General Assembly 2013, 2015). While the 
Group of Governmental Experts managed to clarify many fundamental 
aspects relating to state sovereignty in cyberspace, including the jurisdiction 
of states over cyber infrastructure located on their territory (United Nations 
General Assembly 2013, para. 20), the prohibition on the use of force and 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states (United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly 2015, para. 26), the interpretation of the principle of state 
sovereignty and its application to state conduct in cyberspace have not been 
addressed in great detail.
One of the questions left open by the GGE reports is whether cyber opera-
tions which do not constitute a use of force or intervention into internal affairs 
of another state are nevertheless prohibited by virtue of a duty to respect the 
sovereignty of states, or whether the absence of a specific prohibitive rule 
leaves states free to conduct cyber operations within and against cyber infra-
structure located on the territory of other states (provided they do not rise to 
the level of force or intervene into internal affairs). It is, therefore, no surprise 
that the question whether international law recognizes a general rule of ter-
ritorial sovereignty, operating below the threshold of use of force and inter-
vention is currently one of the most contentious issues in international law, in 
light of the fact that such a rule may be violated through state-conducted or 
state-sponsored cyber operations. Moreover, it remains unclear if this rule is 
recognized, then how to precisely define its scope. Maybe the most prominent 
academic effort to comprehensively map and describe the rules applicable to 
state conduct in cyberspace is the Tallinn Manual. Now in its second edition, 
the Manual states in Rule 4 that “[a] State must not conduct cyber operations 
that violate the sovereignty of another State” (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 17). 
In ascertaining when such a violation of sovereignty may occur, the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 employs an effects-based test which focuses on two bases: the 
degree of infringement upon the state’s territorial integrity and the interfer-
ence with, or usurpation of, inherently governmental functions (Schmitt and 
Vihul 2017c, 20). Under this test, cyber operations which violate the integrity 
of ICT systems in another state by installing malware containing malicious 
payloads are not prohibited per se, unless they lead to the loss of functional-
ity of the target system. In effect, a majority of the Manual’s authors does 
not regard the act of installing and sustaining malicious code in foreign ICT 
systems as a violation of international law.
This chapter critically examines the Tallinn Manual’s Rule 4 and argues 
that a purely effects-based approach to violations of territorial sovereignty is 
at odds with the traditional understanding of sovereignty as espoused by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). If we understand sovereignty as the exclusive right of states 
to regulate entry into their territory and the right to forbid any assertion of 
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jurisdiction or the performance of acts de iure imperii within their territory 
by another state without their consent, then any unauthorized presence and 
any act of foreign state power violates sovereignty, regardless of whether 
these actions cause physical harm or not. Therefore, the chapter argues for a 
different, intrusion-based approach to violations of territorial sovereignty in 
cyberspace. Under the proposed intrusion-based test, the violation of a state’s 
territorial sovereignty is linked to the breach of the information security—
especially the integrity—of the targeted ICT system. This allows for a more 
technical and precise determination of the boundary between permissible and 
impermissible acts in cyberspace and would help to reduce the legal uncer-
tainties which currently exist in relation to low-intensity cyber operations.
This chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it discusses the traditional 
concept of sovereignty and addresses the question whether sovereignty is 
a principle of international law from which more concrete rules of state 
behavior—such as the prohibition on the use of force and the prohibition of 
intervention into internal affairs of other states—derive; or whether it is itself 
a rule of international law, prohibiting conduct which violates the territo-
rial sovereignty of states. While this question has already been addressed in 
many publications (see, e.g., Eichensehr 2015; Heintschel von Heinegg 2012, 
2013; Pirker 2013; Schmitt and Vihul 2017a, 2017b, 2017c), a recent speech 
by the United Kingdom attorney general, Jeremy Wright QC MP, in which 
he firmly spoke against the existence of such a rule of territorial sovereignty 
(Wright 2018), warrants a further look at this issue. Second, it addresses 
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 Rule 4 and its interpretation of the rule of territorial 
sovereignty, with special regard to the tests proposed by the authors of the 
Tallinn Manual to ascertain when a violation of territorial sovereignty takes 
place. Last, it proposes a different, intrusion-based test of the violation of 
territorial sovereignty.
THE CONCEPT OF TERRITORIAL 
SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE
Rule 4 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 states that “[a] State must not conduct cyber 
operations that violate the sovereignty of another State” (Schmitt and Vihul 
2017c, 17). It is based on the assumption that the international legal order 
contains, apart from the prohibition on the use of force and the prohibition of 
intervention into the internal affairs of other states, a separate norm requiring 
respect for the (territorial) sovereignty of other states, which may be violated 
through the performance of certain cyber activities within other states’ territo-
ries without their consent. However, the existence of such a rule has recently 
been put into question—at least with respect to activities in cyberspace. In his 
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Chatham House speech of May 23, 2018, the attorney general of the United 
Kingdom, Jeremy Wright QC MP, has stated that he is “not persuaded that 
we can currently extrapolate from [the] general principle [of sovereignty] a 
specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond that of a pro-
hibited intervention. The UK Government’s position is therefore that there 
is no such rule as a matter of current international law” (Wright 2018). The 
United Kingdom has been the first state to officially articulate its doubts as to 
the existence of a rule of territorial sovereignty in such clear terms, but this 
position seems to reflect earlier arguments brought forth by (at least) some 
branches of the US government. The then legal adviser to the US Depart-
ment of State, Brian Egan, noted that “cyber operations involving computers 
located on another State’s territory do not constitute a violation of interna-
tional law. (. . .) This is perhaps most clear where such activities in another 
State’s territory have no effects or de minimis effects” (Egan 2016). Further-
more, as has been reported by some authors (Watts and Richard 2018, 859; 
Schmitt and Vihul 2017a, 1641), on January 19, 2017, the outgoing general 
counsel of the US Department of Defence has issued a memorandum on the 
“International Law Framework for Employing Cyber Capabilities in Military 
Operations.” The memo—which is not publicly available and whose content 
the present author can therefore only assess through secondary sources—
reportedly stated that sovereignty is not a rule but a “baseline principle” 
which undergirds other binding rules of international law such as the prohibi-
tion on the use of force and the prohibition of intervention (Schmitt and Vihul 
2017a, 1642). The 2017 DoD memo’s position seems to be shared by some 
American authors, including authors which at the time of writing are work-
ing for US Cyber Command (Corn and Taylor 2017; Corn and Jensen 2018).
Two Arguments Against Territorial 
Sovereignty in Cyberspace
The case against the existence of a rule of territorial sovereignty can be sum-
marized as resting on two arguments. First, in what may be called the argu-
ment from lack of state practice, it is stated that there is not sufficient state 
practice and opinio iuris to conclude the existence of such a rule in customary 
international law (Wright 2018; Corn and Jensen 2018). Second, in what may 
be termed the argument from cyberspace design and practicality, it is held 
that while sovereignty has always been tightly tied to territory, the logical 
and social layers of cyberspace have “at most a tenuous connection to geog-
raphy” (Corn and Jensen 2018) and thus territorial concepts are not readily 
transposable to an aterritorial medium by way of simple analogy. Moreover, 
the global reach and availability of cyber infrastructure makes it possible 
for malicious cyber operations to be mounted from a multitude of globally 
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dispersed locations (Corn and Jensen 2018). States wishing to protect their 
cyber infrastructure from such threats, therefore, need to be able to counter 
cyberattacks regardless of their starting location. The sovereignty-as-a-rule 
approach would create “unworkable hurdles to States conducting such limited 
but potentially important operations” (Corn 2017).
According to the lack-of-state-practice argument, sovereignty is a baseline 
principle of international law, from which other, more concrete prohibitive 
rules of international law flow. These rules, such as the prohibition on the use 
of force and the prohibition of intervention, exist as customary international 
law, because they are evidenced by a sufficiently uniform and universal prac-
tice and opinio iuris of states, and/or have been codified in the United Nations 
Charter. Below the threshold of these two rules, “international law does not 
obligate other states to refrain from all activities that might infringe upon or 
operate to the prejudice of the territorial state’s internal sovereignty” (Corn and 
Taylor 2017, 209). Evidence of this is to be seen in the fact that states conduct 
espionage operations within the territory of other states, yet international law 
does not prohibit espionage as such (Corn and Taylor 2017, 209). Moreover, 
one cannot find evidence of one single universal rule of territorial sovereignty, 
as the content of rights in relation to a particular territory varies depending on 
which domain (land, sea, air, space) is affected. While access to airspace is 
severely restricted, and entry without consent is a serious violation of interna-
tional law which may lead to grave consequences (as has most recently been 
evidenced by the shoot down of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish army for 
violating Turkish airspace), international law allows the innocent passage of 
warships through the territorial sea of states and in the case of space, orbiting 
objects do not violate the airspace or territory states they overfly (Corn and 
Taylor 2017, 210). In consequence, given that no separate regime of restricted 
access to a state’s cyberspace domain (below the thresholds of use of force and 
intervention) has yet developed, states are free to act as they wish by virtue of 
their sovereignty, as has been found by the PCIJ in the Lotus case (S.S. Lotus 
[Fr. v. Turk.], 1927 P.C.I.J. Rep. [ser. A] No. 10, at 18).
In the author’s view, both arguments are to be rejected. They disregard 
long-standing jurisprudence of the PCIJ and ICJ, do not take account of more 
recent state practice, and are based on a false understanding of the so-called 
Lotus doctrine whereby states have unlimited freedom of action barring a 
prohibitive rule of international law.
International Jurisprudence Supports the Existence 
of a Rule of Territorial Sovereignty
The essence of state sovereignty is perhaps best captured in a passage from 
Judge Max Huber’s arbitral decision in the Island of Palmas case. The 
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arbitrator stated that “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies 
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right 
to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a 
State” (Island of Palmas [Neth. v. U.S.], P.C.A. 1928, 2 R.I.A.A 829, 838). 
Traditionally, this independence is understood to contain an internal as well 
as an external aspect (Besson 2011; Tsagourias 2015, 17). While internal 
sovereignty means the supreme authority within the state to regulate political, 
social, and legal affairs and enforce rules, external sovereignty pertains to the 
rights and duties of states toward each other and denotes the competence of 
states to engage in activities outside of their territory, subject only to binding 
rules of international law (Crawford 2015, 118). From this internal sover-
eignty arises the authority to determine inter alia who may enter the territory. 
This is exclusive in the sense that “governmental authority carried out on the 
territory of another state is only lawful if performed with the latter’s consent” 
(Crawford 2015, 121). The supreme authority of a state vis-à-vis other states 
within its territory thus gives rise to a fundamental “restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State (. . .) that—failing the existence of a permissive 
rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory 
of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be 
exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule 
derived from international custom or from a convention” (S.S. Lotus [Fr. v. 
Turk.], Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. Ser. A No. 10, p. 4, 18–19). This dictum of 
the PCIJ has been upheld after the entry into force of the UN Charter by the 
ICJ. In the Corfu Channel case, the Court had to decide whether a demining 
operation conducted by the United Kingdom in Albanian territorial waters 
violated Albanian sovereignty even if it was a necessary self-help measure. 
The court held that “[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sov-
ereignty is an essential foundation of international relations. The Court recog-
nizes that the Albanian Government’s complete failure to carry out its duties 
after the explosions (. . .) are extenuating circumstances for the action of the 
United Kingdom Government. But to ensure respect for international law, 
of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British 
Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty” (Corfu Channel [U.K. 
v. Alb.], Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35). Furthermore, in Nicaragua, the 
court clarified the relation between the requirement of respect for territorial 
sovereignty and the lex specialis prohibition on the use of force. It held that 
“[t]he effects of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty inevitably 
overlap with those of the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and 
of non-intervention. Thus the assistance to the contras (. . .) not only amount 
to an unlawful use of force, but also constitute infringements of the territo-
rial sovereignty of Nicaragua, and incursions into its territorial and internal 
waters” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
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[Nicar. v. U.S.], Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 251). What becomes 
clear from this brief overview is, therefore, that sovereignty is not only a prin-
ciple, from which other more specific rules are derived, but that sovereignty 
demands respect for the supreme authority of a state within its territory and 
as such forms itself a prohibitive rule of international law. Territorial sover-
eignty is, therefore, a “baseline rule” derived from general international law 
(Watts and Richard 2018, 859), which reflects the structural framework of 
international law for the exercise of state sovereignty in order “to ensure the 
co-existence of independent communities and facilitate the achievement of 
common aims” (Hertogen 2015, 912). As Judge Shahabuddeen has noted in 
his dissent in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion: “It is difficult (. . .) to 
uphold a proposition that, absent a prohibition, a State has a right in law to 
act in ways which could deprive the sovereignty of all other States of mean-
ing” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 393–394).
State Practice Is Not Uniform
With regard to state practice, it is certainly true that so far only a small num-
ber of states have publicly presented their understanding of the application 
of sovereignty to cyberspace. Declarations such as the speech given by the 
UK attorney general help to identify and clarify the content of international 
norms applicable to cyberspace and may, in time, be of sufficient number 
and uniformity to restrict the application of a rule of territorial sovereignty 
to cyberspace along the lines advocated by Attorney General Wright and 
some American authors (Schmitt 2018, 18). However, in the author’s view, 
the current state practice on this topic is not uniform and may even point to a 
majority position contrary to the attorney general’s. For instance, in a speech 
held at Chatham House London on May 18, 2015, the then commissioner 
for International Cyber Policy of the German Foreign Office, Ambassador 
Norbert Riedel, stated that “There is consensus that State sovereignty and 
international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State 
conduct of activities related to information and communication technology, 
and to their jurisdiction over the required infrastructure within their territory.” 
While cyberattacks which amount to a use of force or even an armed attack 
are prohibited by the UN Charter and customary international law, “[e]ven 
in cases where one cannot speak of a use of force, the use of cyber capabili-
ties might constitute a violation of sovereignty, if the attack can be attributed 
to a state” (Riedel 2015). The argument that territorial sovereignty applies 
in cyberspace is even more forcefully put forward by France. The French 
“Strategic Review of Cyberdefence” (Revue stratégique de cyberéfense) 
of February 12, 2018 offers the view that cyber incidents of a significant, 
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but not extreme, impact fall below the threshold of armed attack, but may 
nevertheless constitute other internationally wrongful acts such as interven-
tion, violation of sovereignty or use of force (“les actions correspondant à 
ces niveaux pourraient néanmoins constituer d’autres faits internationaux 
illicites [intervention, violation de la souveraineté, usage de la force, etc.])” 
(Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale 2018, 80). This 
view is elaborated upon in the declaration on “International Law Applicable 
to Operations in Cyberspace” (Droit international appliqué aux opérations 
dans le cyberespace”), published by the Ministry of Defence on 9 Septem-
ber 2019. The document argues that since France has sovereignty over ICT 
systems located within its territory, any cyberattack—defined as an operation 
which breaches the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the targeted 
system—constitutes at minimum a violation of sovereignty, if attributable to 
another state. Such a violation occurs not only when effects are produced on 
French territory, but already when there is a penetration of French computer 
systems (Ministère des Armées 2019, 6–7).
Similarly, the GGE consensus reports clearly conclude that states have 
jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure located within their territory (United 
Nations General Assembly 2015, akap. 28[a]). States regularly assert 
jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over activities within their cyber infra-
structure. For example, on July 13, 2018, the US Special Counsel filed an 
indictment of twelve Russian intelligence officers alleged to have hacked the 
servers of the Democratic National Committee and thus to have committed 
computer-related offenses within the United States (United States vs. Netyk-
sho et al., US District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 1:18-cr-
00215-ABJ, filed July 13, 2018). It is thus clear that states treat activities 
within their cyber infrastructure as falling into the territorial confines of their 
sovereignty (some states even speak of “national cyberspace,” e.g., the Pol-
ish cybersecurity strategy “Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni Rzeczpospo-
litej Polskiej” [Ministerstwo Administracji i Cyfryzacji 2013]), even though 
some states may deny the existence of a rule of territorial sovereignty. In the 
author’s view, it follows from sovereignty over ICT devices that sovereign 
activities conducted within the cyber infrastructure located on the territory of 
other states violate their territorial sovereignty if they constitute an exercise 
of power without the consent of the affected state.
In summary, it may very well be that the rule of territorial sovereignty in 
cyberspace will have to adapt for the (perceived) aterritoriality of the logical 
and social layers of cyberspace, the loss of distance typical for geographical 
territory and the ease of access this structural characteristic of cyberspace 
presents to malicious cyber actors. The practical necessity of defending 
against threats originating from multiple locations and using cyber infra-
structure located in various states, coupled with the currently slow process of 
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international legal assistance and the disinterest or inability of many states to 
actively counter malicious activity emanating from their cyber infrastructure, 
may require an adjustment of the international legal regime to allow for a 
greater degree of self-help (although, as the Tallinn Manual points out, legal 
remedies in the form of countermeasures and the doctrine of necessity are 
available [Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 111–141]). But, as the law currently 
stands, the baseline rule of territorial sovereignty, as recognized by the ICJ 
in Corfu Channel and Nicaragua, still applies. States arguing for its nonex-
istence would have to demonstrate on the basis of universal state practice 
and opinio iuris the emergence of an exception to territorial sovereignty in 
cyberspace, not the other way around.
VIOLATIONS OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
UNDER THE TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 RULE 4
Assuming that territorial sovereignty exists as a rule of international law and 
further assuming that this rule is applicable to state conduct in cyberspace, the 
next question is to ascertain the precise content of this rule. So far, the most 
elaborate attempt to formulate a test for the violation of territorial sovereignty 
in cyberspace has been offered by the authors of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in 
Rule 4 (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 17). The Tallinn Manual 2.0 stipulates 
that the lawfulness of remote cyber operations that manifest on a state’s ter-
ritory depend on the “degree of infringement upon the target State’s territo-
rial integrity” and/or on the “interference with or usurpation of inherently 
governmental functions” (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 20). With regard to the 
infringement upon territorial integrity, the Manual’s authors stipulate that 
cyber operations, which result in physical damage, show a sufficient degree 
of infringement to constitute a violation of territorial sovereignty. Further-
more, the experts argue that a loss of functionality of the targeted system 
may constitute a violation of sovereignty, if it reaches a certain threshold. 
The precise threshold could not be established, but the experts agreed that 
cyber operations resulting in the requirement to replace and repair computer 
systems or their components are sufficiently akin to physical damage to con-
stitute a violation of sovereignty (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 21). There was 
no consensus among the experts as to whether cyber operations falling below 
the threshold of loss of functionality violate territorial sovereignty; therefore, 
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 does not take a position on this issue.
The Tallinn Manual’s approach to territorial sovereignty is thus largely 
effects-based. The Tallinn Manual itself does not explain how the authors 
arrived at the abovementioned set of factors to determine the existence of 
a violation of sovereignty. It appears that these factors are derived from a 
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particular interpretation of the object and purpose of sovereignty: since the 
physical damage of targeted computer systems and the loss of functionality 
requiring repair and replacement lead to similar effects as unconsented physi-
cal presence, they, therefore, infringe sovereignty, which “clearly protects 
territorial integrity against physical violation” (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 
20). Furthermore, the Manual takes into account the traditional aspect of 
sovereignty of regulating access to territory (c.f. Vilvarajah and others v UK, 
ECtHR, Ser. A, 215, October 30, 1991) and concludes that territorial sov-
ereignty is violated if a state conducts cyber operations when its agents are 
physically present in the target state (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 19). Virtual 
presence through remote-access cyber operations, on the other hand, seems 
not to be sufficient to violate territorial sovereignty.
In the author’s view, this approach overemphasizes physical effects on ter-
ritory, while omitting a crucial aspect of sovereignty, namely the exercise of 
state power. Moreover, the emphasis on the physical effects of a cyber opera-
tion does not sufficiently take into account the technical side of most cyber 
operations, thus leading to difficulties in the precise determination when a 
violation of territorial sovereignty occurs or is ongoing.
Regarding the first point, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 seems to consider the 
main object and purpose of sovereignty to be “the protection of territorial 
integrity against physical violation” (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c, 20). How-
ever, as discussed above, the regulation of access to territory is but one of the 
aspects of internal sovereignty. Furthermore, the main aim of this exclusive 
right of the state is not to protect its territory from physical effects—after all, 
unconsented overflights or transboundary abductions, which are regarded as 
violations of territorial sovereignty (Wilske 2012), do not usually cause dam-
age or lasting physical effects on the territory of the affected state. Rather, 
the object and purpose of the rule of territorial sovereignty is to be seen in 
the protection of the exclusivity of state authority within its territory. As held 
by the PCIJ in the S.S.Lotus: “failing the existence of a permissive rule to the 
contrary [a State] may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of 
another State” (S.S. Lotus [Fr. v. Turk.], Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. Ser. A No. 
10, pp. 4, 18–19). While in a globalized world, and especially in cyberspace, 
actions undertaken by one state may very well have a substantial effect on 
the (cyber) territory of other states, this effect has to be tolerated by virtue of 
the principle of sovereign equality only insofar as it is a consequence of the 
exercise of the acting state’s internal sovereignty. Conversely, the exercise 
of state power within the territory of another state violates the target state’s 
exclusive authority and thus its territorial sovereignty. Admittedly, one has to 
be careful with territorial analogies with regard to cyberspace, as the medium 
has different characteristics. Nevertheless, every action taken through 
cyberspace manifests itself on cyber infrastructure located within a specific 
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territory. As the UN GGE noted in its two reports, states have jurisdiction 
over the ICT infrastructure located within their territory (United Nations 
General Assembly 2015, akap. 28[a]) and they do assert their jurisdiction 
over actions performed by individuals as well as agents of other states. If 
the agents of a state perform cyber operations within the cyber infrastructure 
of another state in ways other than the intended use of said cyber infrastruc-
ture, that is, by violating the information security of computer systems, they 
exercise state power vis-à-vis cyber infrastructure under the jurisdiction of 
another state. Thereby they actively change the functioning of computer sys-
tems within the sphere of authority of another state and thus exercise a power 
which, by virtue of the principle of sovereignty, should remain exclusively 
with that state.
Secondly, if the violation of territorial integrity depended on the manifesta-
tion of physical effects, states would not have a legal remedy against cyber 
operations which are in their preparatory stages or ongoing. Looking at the 
technical side of cyber operations, one sees that conducting offensive cyber 
operations requires several preparatory steps: identifying a target, choosing 
the appropriate attack vector, bypassing the security of the attacked computer 
system and finally conducting the intended activity. There are many analyti-
cal models describing the various steps of a cyberoperation and its effects 
(Smeets 2017, 30; CCHS 2016, 5; Ducheine 2015, 230), but one of the most 
common models—the so-called Cyber Kill Chain, developed by employees 
of the Lockheed Martin Corporation—divides cyber operations into seven 
phases: Reconnnaisance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installa-
tion, Command and Control and Action on objective (Hutchins, Cloppert and 
Amin 2011, 5). During the reconnaissance phase, the attacker identifies and 
selects potential targets. Information about the target can be collected from 
many sources: from open-source intelligence through secret intelligence 
sources, to the scanning of computer systems (for a detailed description see 
Maybaum 2013, 217–219). After identifying the proper target and its vulner-
abilities, the attackers can gain access to the targeted system (delivery and 
exploitation phases). This can happen remotely (in so-called remote-access 
cyber operations, e.g., by sending an infected message to the victim’s mail-
box) or directly (in so-called close-access cyber operations, e.g., by install-
ing malicious software directly on the target system by the agent, vendor) 
(Owens and ors. 2009, 87). Most often, malicious code installed after gaining 
access does not yet contain the proper harmful payload but is used for self-
replication and “raising the drawbridge” through which the system will be 
accessed and further payloads will be installed. In many cases, the installed 
code is a so-called Remote Access Tool (RAT), which makes contact with 
the command and control server and waits for further commands from the 
attackers (Maybaum 2013, 122).
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The activities described above are preparatory phases of a cyber operation. 
The further course depends on the intentions and decisions of the attacker. If 
the purpose of the operation is to obtain confidential information, the payload 
will contain code for searching information, tracking the user’s computer 
communication, activating the camera and microphone, and so on. If the pur-
pose is to destroy data or impact on machines and processes controlled by a 
given computer system, the payload will contain appropriate mechanisms. To 
this end, many RATs allow the installation of additional modules, depending 
on the operator’s current needs. It should be noted that the nature of a cyber 
operation is not obvious at the time the information security of the infected 
system is first compromised. It is only the content of the payload that deter-
mines whether it is intended for espionage or for specific damage. In the case 
of most cyber operations, the determination of their character is possible only 
after technical analysis of the payload, which requires technical expertise, 
adequate resources and time (the technical analysis of Stuxnet took several 
months after its initial discovery [Falliere, Murchu, and Chien 2011]). Never-
theless, the initial illegal access to the targeted computer system, irrespective 
of the subsequent actions, already constitutes a criminal offense against the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems under 
the domestic law of many states, as required by Art. 2 of the 2001 Cybercrime 
Convention (Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23.11.2001, E.T.S. No. 
185).
The outline of a typical cyber operation above is obviously very simpli-
fied. However, three conclusions can be drawn: first, actors conducting cyber 
operations use previously identified vulnerabilities to gain access to computer 
systems without authorization, thus breaching the information security of the 
targeted systems. Second, the unauthorized intrusion into computer systems 
constitutes a breach of their information security and thereby a criminal 
offense. Third, the intended effect of a cyber operation is ascertainable either 
after the prior detection and technical analysis of the payload, or after the 
activation of the payload and the materialization of its effects. If the violation 
of territorial sovereignty were to depend exclusively on the physical effects 
of a cyber operation (either through physical damage or a significant loss of 
functionality), the intrusion into a computer system and the compromising of 
its information security would not yet constitute a violation of sovereignty 
(although in most cases it would already constitute a criminal offense under 
the domestic law of the targeted state). Under the so-called Lotus doctrine, 
which presumes a state’s freedom of action unless a prohibitive norm has 
been created through state consent (Kwiecień 2012, 48), this freedom to 
act would in effect create a freedom to install malware on foreign computer 
systems. Although the targeted state would still be free to sanction violations 
of information security under its domestic law, it would be powerless to 
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prevent this under international law, as countermeasures and the obligation of 
cessation depend on the existence of an internationally wrongful act (United 
Nations International Law Commission 2001). In consequence, the interna-
tional legal order would be put in a situation where, based on its external 
sovereignty, a state would be free to exercise its power through cyber opera-
tions, affecting the information security of computer infrastructure in other 
states, and to allow its agents to commit criminal offenses, while the targeted 
states would have no legal redress to enforce the exclusivity of their author-
ity within their territory. To quote Judge Shahabuddeen again: “It is difficult 
(. . .) to uphold a proposition that, absent a prohibition, a State has a right 
in law to act in ways which could deprive the sovereignty of all other States 
of meaning” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 
393–394).
AN INTRUSION-BASED APPROACH TO 
VIOLATIONS OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
Given this unsatisfactory state of events, what could an alternative approach 
to violations of territorial sovereignty look like? The author proposes to start 
from what the rule of territorial sovereignty seeks to prohibit: the unauthor-
ized exercise of state power in the territory of another state, as exemplified 
in the Lotus judgment (S.S. Lotus [Fr. v. Turk.], Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
Ser. A No. 10, pp. 4, 18–19). It is clear from this and other judgments such 
as Corfu Channel, as well as state practice, that the exercise of state power is 
not measured by the effects of one state’s actions on the territory of another 
state, but rather by the nature of the action itself. Any activity of a sovereign 
(i.e., noncommercial) nature taken within or against another state’s territory 
without that state’s consent or a legal basis in international law constitutes an 
unauthorized exercise of state power and thus a violation of territorial sover-
eignty. This is why United Kingdom’s demining operation in Albanian ter-
ritorial waters (see Corfu Channel [U.K. v. Alb.], Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 
4, 35), the US training and financing of Contra rebels in Nicaragua (Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua [Nicar. v. U.S.], Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 251) or the abduction of a person from the 
territory of a state by the agents of another state (Ghafur Hamid 2004, 79) 
constitute such violations.
It is furthermore clear that while cyberspace undoubtedly has other proper-
ties than physical space, it is by no means aterritorial, as has been claimed 
in the 1990s (Johnson and Post 1996). It is true that data mobility and inter-
connectedness pose a challenge to strictly territorial notions of jurisdiction 
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requiring a reconceptualization or a new approach (Daskal 2015; Roguski 
2019), but this challenge does not invalidate the strict link between geog-
raphy and sovereignty in cyberspace (but compare Corn and Jensen 2018). 
This is because actions taken against specific computers or networks, even 
if undertaken remotely, ultimately manifest themselves in the territory of 
the state where the physical infrastructure is located. For this reason, states 
continue to assert jurisdiction over the physical components of cyberspace 
(United Nations General Assembly 2015) and apply their national (criminal) 
law to actions taken against these components, irrespective of the loca-
tion of the perpetrators (U.S. District Court, ND California, U.S. v. Dmitry 
Dokuchaev, et al., Case 3:17-cr-00103-VC).
Established notions of international law and current state practice, 
therefore, suggest that states can (and do) assert exclusive authority over 
computers and networks physically located within their territory and, in 
consequence, any exercise of power by other states in those networks, 
irrespective of its physical effects, would violate the territorial integrity 
of that state. What, then, should be the test for establishing the exercise of 
state power through cyberspace within the territory of another state? Rather 
than to focus on the physical effects of cyber operations, the present author 
proposes to focus instead on the technical aspects of a cyber operation. As 
has been shown above, the essence of every cyber operation is the act of 
“hacking,” or—to use a definition well established in the technical (and 
legal) community, the breach of the information security of a computer sys-
tem through an action compromising either the confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of the information stored in the computer system (Kosseff 
2018). This so-called CIA Triad, although not a legal definition, is well 
established in the realm of cybersecurity and is used by some states—Ger-
many and Austria, for example—to define a cyberattack in their national 
cyber strategies (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich 2013, Bundesministerium 
des Inneren 2016). Moreover, under the Cybercrime Convention (Conven-
tion on Cybercrime, 23.11.2001, E.T.S. No. 185) states parties are obliged 
to penalize offenses against the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of computer data and systems (Convention on Cybercrime Articles 2–8). 
In particular, the Cybercrime Convention obliges states parties to crimi-
nalize illegal access to computer systems, data and system interference, 
computer-related fraud and so on. Most states parties have implemented 
these provisions into their national law or have similar provisions. The 
United States, for instance, have penalized computer crime, including 
computer intrusions, denial-of-service attacks, and viruses (Doyle 2014; 
US Department of Justice—Computer Crime and Intellectual Property 
Section 2010) through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (codified in 18 
U.S. Code 1030).
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Since computer crimes and state cyberattacks share the same techni-
cal characteristics and the forensic analysis of both types of attacks is the 
same—the difference lying only in the attribution of the action constituting 
a computer crime to a state actor, thus subjecting it to international rather 
than (only) national law—the present author proposes to use the criterion 
of computer intrusion or interference to assess the moment state power is 
exercised in the territory (cyber infrastructure) of another state. This means 
that whenever a foreign state damages, deletes, deteriorates, alters, or sup-
presses data stored on a computer system within the territory of another state 
(compare Art. 4 Cybercrime Convention), this action would be regarded as 
an exercise of state power and thus a violation of the territorial sovereignty 
of the targeted state.
The criterion of “intrusion,” closely related to the integrity of data stored 
on a computer system, does not encompass every action of a state in foreign 
networks. For instance, intrusion does not mean the regular use of cyberspace 
infrastructure for their intended purposes, as no damage to or alteration of 
data is being done in this process. This is true even for actions undertaken 
with malicious intent, such as port scanning for the purposes of reconnais-
sance and preparation of a cyberattack in the future. Since the scanning of 
ports is possible without interference with data stored in a network due to the 
technical design and functioning of global networks such as the Internet and 
states allow the use of their ICT infrastructure for the purposes of informa-
tion transfer, regular usage, even including the routing of cyber operations 
through foreign infrastructure, would therefore not violate territorial sover-
eignty. Similarly, even gaining access to a computer network without proper 
authorization (i.e., breaching the confidentiality of a computer system or net-
work, for instance through phishing) would not constitute an intrusion under 
the proposed test as the integrity of data stored within the system would not 
be compromised. The present author submits that the focus on the integrity 
(rather than its confidentiality or availability) of a computer system or data 
stored therein is justified, as it is the interference with the functioning of a 
computer system in the territory of another state—for example, the deletion 
or alteration of data, the implantation of malware, remote access tools, the use 
of the computer system to cause effects on systems or processes controlled by 
that computer.—which bears the closest resemblance to the exercise of state 
power in the traditional sense.
The proposed intrusion-based approach would have several advantages 
over the no-sovereignty approach advocated by the UK attorney general 
(Wright 2018) or the effects-based approach proposed by the Tallinn Man-
ual 2.0 (Schmitt and Vihul 2017c). First, with respect to the sovereignty-
as-a-principle view, it respects established international jurisprudence and 
international law, which is, in the view of the present author, unequivocal 
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in this point. Secondly, with respect to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 approach, 
focusing on a technical, rather than an effects-based criterion, has the 
advantage of forensic clarity and predictability, thus enhancing legal 
certainty. Whereas a successful hacking operation may not produce any 
physical effects at all or these effects may not manifest for some time, under 
the intrusion-based approach it is the hacking itself which constitutes the 
violation of sovereignty. The affected state would thus not have to wait for 
physical effects to emerge—or to be severe enough—to be legally entitled 
to enact countermeasures. Thirdly, the close resemblance of the intrusion 
criterion to the legal framework regulating computer crimes would allow 
states to rely on technical expertise and procedures established by law 
enforcement. In other words—the terrain would be more familiar. And 
lastly, treating computer intrusions as violations of sovereignty would truly 
establish territorial sovereignty as the “baseline” norm (Watts and Richard 
2018) in cyberspace, thus creating a predictable framework of primary 
norms and norms-imposing consequences for their breach (such as counter-
measures) and could therefore enhance the stability of cyberspace through 
clear legal principles.
The approach proposed in this chapter has recently gained prominent sup-
port in the form of the French declaration on “International Law Applicable 
to Operations in Cyberspace,” which has been published after the submission 
date of this article and thus can only be briefly referred to. In this document, 
France argues that a violation of sovereignty may already exist when there is 
a penetration of computer systems under the sovereignty of France (Ministère 
des Armées 2019, 6–7). Given that a penetration occurs when there is a 
breach of the information security, that is, the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability, of the targeted system, it is similar to the criterion of intrusion 
proposed in this article.
CONCLUSION
This chapter argued that territorial sovereignty, which as a primary norm of 
international law is also applicable to state conduct in cyberspace, requires 
a clear and operable criterion in order to provide a clear and predictable 
framework for states to operate in. Rather than concentrating on the physical 
effects of cyber operations, it is proposed that an intrusion-based approach, 
which concentrates on the technical side of cyber operations, would provide 
a familiar, less ambiguous and more viable tool for assessing violations 
of sovereignty in cyberspace. The criterion of intrusion conforms to the 
essence of territorial sovereignty, which is the regulation of access to terri-
tory and the preservation of exclusivity of state power within its territory. It 
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is independent of the intent of the attacking state and the consequences of 
its actions and relies on a verifiable technical criterion to ascertain whether 
a violation of territorial sovereignty has taken place. Furthermore, if the 
internationally wrongful act of violating the territorial sovereignty of a state 
in cyberspace were to depend on the intrusion into the targeted computer 
system, rather than on the effects of that intrusion, the targeted state would 
have legal redress in the form of a right to demand cessation and to institute 
countermeasures before the harmful effects of the cyber operation material-
ize, rather than after. In conclusion, an intrusion-based approach to territorial 
sovereignty would more clearly reflect the object and purpose of sovereignty, 
allow states to counter malicious activities before their effects are manifested 
and would more clearly correspond to the technical side of cyber operations. 
Although the interpretation of international law in cyberspace has solidified 
with respect to many norms, for example, the use of force, only a fraction 
of states has thus far set out their views on the application of territorial sov-
ereignty in cyberspace. New ideas can—and should—be explored and dis-
cussed. The new Group of Governmental Experts as well as the Open-Ended 
Working Group, which have been established in 2019 to further explore the 
interpretation and application of international law in cyberspace, would be 
good fora for such discussions.
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